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an interview with him and the director of public
relations. In this interview, the Director asked me
whether I had 'an open mind' about research using
animals. I said I did, and shortly was asked to become
a member of the committee. I was not asked whether I
was for this, that, or the other type of research nor
whether I was against this, that, or the other. And the
Director seemed wen aware that I might vote against
various research proposals and that I might ask various
awkward or unwelcome questions. He did not appear
to want a layperson who would simply rubber stamp
whatever proposal met the approval of the other
members of the committee, and there was some
indication that he was even desirous of having a person
on the committee who would raise important questions
that would not otherwise be raised. I believe that, by
the letter of the law, he did not have to have these
concerns, and that he could have attempted to appoint
a rubber stamp, but I think there are powerful political
reasons, constituted primarily by the animal rights
movement, favoring the course of action this Director
took, and that these reasons apply to many other
directors of such institutions as the ORPRC across
the US.
After being appointed, I was given the NIH guide
for the care and use of laboratory animals. This is the
Bible for IACUCs. It would not be unfair to say that
this guide is most consonant with a laissez{aire

Editors' Note: This essay by Professor
Stephenson and the response to it by Professor
Gendin were presented at the Eastern Division
meetings of the Society for the Study or Ethics
and Animals held in Atlanta, Georgia,
December, 1989.
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In his article on IACUCS,l L. Finsen provides three
useful categories of ethical pmlpectives one can take
on research using nonhuman animals. One can hold to
a laissez{aire approach, a 'moderate' approach, or an
abolitionist approach. The first considers that aU
research on nonhuman animals is justifiable provided
it adheres to 'humane' standards of minimizing pain
and distress; the third considers that no research
on nonhuman animals is justifiable whether it is
'humanely' conducted or not; and the second,
'moderate', approach, holds that some research is
justifIable, some not, depending on the purpose of the
research, and that all justifiable research must adhere
to 'humane' standards.
In this paper I want to 1) relate how a 'moderate'
was appointed to the Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee (IACUC) at the Oregon Regional Primate
Research Center (ORPRC) and some of the results of
this; 2) raise questions as to the proper place for the
sort of ethical concern for animals that Finsen supports;
3) indicate why I'm a 'moderate'.

PHILOSOPHY

1. I was appointed as the lay, outside, member of
the IACUC at ORPRC by the Director of ORPRC after
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approach to research using animals but that it is not
inconsistent with a 'moderate' approach. Specifically,
it does not disallow the question, Does the purpose of
this research and the likely benefits either to humans or
to animals warrant using animals in the way proposed?
That it does not entail or mandate this question seems
to me to be a defect in it, but that, except on very strict
and determined constructions of it, it doesn't disallow
the asking of this question means that it makes room
for 'moderates' on IACUCs.
The IACUC on which I serve requires that each
researcher submit to the committee a 'Notice ofIntent'
(NOI). Shortly after I joined the committee this NOI
was revised. The chair solicited help from members,
and I requested that there be a section in which the
researcher is required to answer the following directive:
'State, in lay terms, how your proposed research is likely
to benefit human or animal health or well-being'. This
request was adopted. This means that each researcher
has to say something in this section, and that something
is, for me (and I think for any 'moderate'), of
fundamental importance for evaluating the justifiability
of the proposed project
I now give an example of a controversy generated
by thinking about this question, which is also an
example of the impact a 'moderate' can have on an
IACUC. At ORPRC, a good deal of research pertains
to the problem of human infertility (HIR:::Human
Infertility Research). Some of this research involves
the use of monkeys and baboons. This 'use' involves
killing some of them, separating infants from their
mothers at birth, as well as subjecting them to various
operations and manipulations (not to mention the
original acts of capturing them or their progenitors and
caging them in individual cages). The justification for
all this is 'the problem of human infertility.' In essence,
this problem is that some couples who want to have
children in the nonnal biological way (the figure may
be as high as 20% of all such couples who want to have
children in the normal way) cannot do so without
medical help. So, in short, the problem is that some
couples cannot fulfill their desire to have children. Is
the possibility of alleviating this a sufficientjustification
for 'using' monkeys and baboons in the ways indicated
above? I asked thisquestion of the committee and began
arguing that it was not The essence of my argument is
that nonhuman primates should be subjected to the types
of uses above indicated only if: 1) seriously lifethreatening diseases or disabilities or seriously life-
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diminishing diseases or disabilities are in question; 2)
there is good reason to believe that they are likely to be
ameliorated by using animals; 3) it is not now plausible
to argue that humans are themselves responsible for
the diseases and disabilities from which they suffer due
to activities they could abstain from if they would. I
was able to do this because of the question on the NOI
pertaining to the likely benefits to humans or animals.
My questioning generated much heat and activity and
some rethinking and reevaluation, and still continues
to do so, though my arguments have not, by any means,
produced the changes I think desirable and even
obligatory. (perhaps they shouldn't; perhaps they're
not convincing. The point is, there was and is a forum
for their getting stated and the potential for their having
the desired effect)
2. As Finsen brings out in his article, the authorized
function of the IACUCs is to see to it that the NIH
guidelines are followed. These guidelines, as Finsen
also brings out,lean toward the laissezlaire perspective
and do not require "discussion and evaluation of the
ethical dimensions of proposed and ongoing research
involving animals," if"ethical dimensions" is here taken
to encompass questions outside those of pain, suffering,
the performance of multiple major surgeries on one
animal, and the method of killing the animal. Now, in
my view, the NIH guidelines should require a broader
discussion than they do. But I think it is insufficiently
recognized that Congress has authorized and provided
the funds for institutions such as ORPRC to do basic
research using a variety of nonhuman animals, thereby
indicating approval of such research. It is not at all
clear that. given this approval, it is required that it direct
the NIH to pass regulations which require that
researchers have their proposals subjected to wideranging ethical scrutiny, especially of the kind the
abolitionist would insist on. It may be that it is wrong
to do the kind of research using nonhuman animals that
scores of research facilities authorized by Congress
around the nation do. But it is not clear why Congress
is required to pass regulations which require each
institution engaging in research that it (or its agents)
judges to be ethically appropriate to debate the rightness
or wrongness of such research. And it is far from clear
that it makes sense to include an abolitionist as part of
any IACUC. The IACUC is not there to shut down the
place, if it can, but to enforce regulations which
Congress (or its representatives) judges to be
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appropriate within the context of its broad approval of
such research. The most appropriate place for the
abolitionist is in the forums for public debate (including
Congress, should one be able to get elected) about what
policies there should be.

certain ways, provided they undertake to do likewise.
(Consider some of these ways. I am to refrain from
eating human flesh, not merely from revulsion or
irrational taboo, but out of respect for human beings. I
am to favor appropriate disposition of human remains,
not out of health or aesthetic considerations, but out of
respect. I am to prefer to kill any kind of animal rather
than kill any human being, again out of respect and
human solidarity implicit in the social contract. I am
to think of human needs []fst rather than animal needs.
Anyone failing to live up to these and other ways of
dealing with their fellow human beings are rightly
regarded as outside society to a degree, because
insufficiently mindful of their fellow citizens and
social mates.)
My third response is that I value lots of humans more
than I value any animal. This is, obviously, not to say I
don't value animals. It's not to say that I don't value
them a great deal and think that a great deal that is done
to them is of little value and is wrong. But why am I
wrong to value lots of humans a good dt',al more than I
value any animal? I could tell you why I do-I can
talk to them, engage in various enjoyable activities with
them, share their joys and sorrows, etc. You will then
ask me why these are valuable, more valuable than what
I can do with animals or what animals can do with each
other. But then I can ask you why they are not more
valuable and the question will probably end in stalemate,
values and evaluation of values being what they are. I
can then add, what I've already said, that I do value
lots of humans a lot more than I value any animal.
The upshot is this. I'm a 'moderate' because I value
my son's life, and many other human lives, more than I
value any animal's life; and I live in a state of society
where it is incumbent on me, and all others, to treat
each other in certain ways. This state of society is
something I value, something that seems essential, given
my values, and something that grows out of my values,
also. And, as of now, I can't see any good Tt',ason for
changing it in the way aboiitionists would have us do.

3. The discussion to this point has not been terribly
philosophical. I now want to indicate why I am a
'moderate', thereby throwing down the gauntlet for
philosoprucaldebare.
If I knew that my son would contract multiple
sclerosis (MS) when he reaches 14, would slowly
become crippled and unable to live the active life most
adults take for granted, and that he would die at age 30
in what would otherwise have been the prime of his
life, I would favor research that involves using
nonhuman animals, specifically primates, that would
certainly spare him this fate. I would favor it knowing
that it involves, among other things, caging the
experimental animals, performing surgery on them,
subjecting them to some factor believed to cause MS,
and eventually painlessly killing them. I would favor
it even if it had merely a good chance of sparing him
this fate.
Now to this the standard comeback is: "You
wouldn't favor any of this if it involved human beings.
So how can you favor it simply because it involves
monkeys? What is the morally relevant difference?"
My fIrst response to this is one of incredulity. Is
one saying that if one could save one's dearly beloved
young wife or daughter from some tragic disease by
capturing a monkey and using it in the ways indicated
in research, one would not do it? I have heard animal
advocates say that they would do it, but that that
wouldn't make it right. But then they're simply failing
to live up to their ethical standards, and the question is
why they should fail thus. Why not live up to them if
they actually believe them? My guess is that they don't
actually believe them. They value their loved ones a
lot more than they value nonhuman animals.
My second response to this standard comeback is to
say that in a state of nature, I would favor doing to
human beings what I now favor doing only to nonhuman
animals. I don't favor doing to humans what I propose
to do to animals not because I think hwnans as a species
possess some distinctive, inherently valuable properties
but, in part, because I'm in a state of society with respect
to humans. In this state I've undertaken to treat them
in certain ways, and to refrain from treating them in
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